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RIGHT TO COUNSEL: MIRANDA AND THE MILITARY
On June 10, 1966, the United States Supreme Court decided
Miranda v. Arizona.1 Although the results of this decision were
explosive, the holding of the Court was not surprising in light of
other recent Supreme Court decisions. Chief Justice Warren, speaking
for the majority, set out in detail "the restraints society must observe
consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for
crime."'2 Just as explosive in military law and more surprising was
the decision of the United States Court of Military Appeals in
United States v. Tempia,3 which applied the principles of Miranda
to the military. Just 1 year earlier, Chief Judge Quinn, in United
States v. Wimberly, stated:
We are not persuaded, however, that the right to counsel must be
extended to include the investigative processes. Nothing in the Uni-
form Code or in the decisions of this court, and nothing in our experi-
ence with military methods of interrogation, indicate that the only
feasible way to give maximum effect to the Constitutional right to
the assistance of counsel is that the accused have counsel beside him
during police questioning. 4
In considering the effect of the Miranda decision on the military,
it will be necessary to consider the history of the right to counsel
in the military, the Miranda and Tempia decisions, and some of
the later cases that have applied the Miranda doctrine to military
prosecutions. Some problems caused by Miranda peculiar to the
military will also be explored.
History
In 1950, the Uniform Code of Military Justice5 was enacted to
prevent many of the unjust results evident in the system of military
justice. The Code was created to lessen the influence of the com-
mander and to insure the accused safeguards which had previously
been denied.6 Under article 31, which is still in existence, no person
can be compelled to incriminate himself.7 Before any statement may
be taken, the interrogator must also inform the accused of the
nature of the accusation and his right to remain silent.8 If this
warning is not given, any statement made by the accused is inadmis-
sible as evidence.9 Since the enactment of article 31 of the Code,
its standards have been as strict as those advocated in Miranda and
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 Id. at 439.
3 16 U.S.C.IMLA. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
4 16 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 10, 36 C.M.R. 159, 166 (1966).
G 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964) [hereinafter referred to in text as the
Code].
G DEP'T OF ARMy, MILITARY JUSTIcE-TRIAL PRoCEDURE 6 (No. 27-173, June
30, 1964).
7 10 U.S.C. § 831(a) (1964).
8 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (1964).
9 10 U.S.C. § 831(d) (1964).
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its requirements were not changed by that decision or the Tempia
decision.
The importance of Miranda to the military is in the area of right
to counsel. Prior to that decision, the Code was the guideline for
the military courts. Article 27 of the Code provides that legal
counsel will represent the accused at a general court-martial.10 Right
to counsel is extended by article 32 to the pre-trial investigation
leading to a general court-martial." This right is available to all
military personnel, not just to the indigent.12 With few exceptions,
legal counsel is not provided at special or summary courts-martial
though legal counsel can be retained by the accused at his expense.
1 3
But legal counsel is provided at every step of appellate review.
14
Though the Code in its inception left many questions unanswered
as to right to counsel, it was considerably ahead of most of its
civilian counterparts. Because of this, the United States Court of
10 10 U.S.C. § 827(a) (1964). Three types of military courts were es-
tablished by the Code: the general court-martial, the special court-martial,
and the summary court-martial. 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1964). The general court-
martial is similar to a civilian trial court with power to try felonies. A
legally trained law officer sits as judge and passes on questions of law. At
the conclusion of the trial, he instructs the board or members of the court on
the law of the particular case. A board of officers are the fact-finders and
are not legally trained. The accused is represented by legal counsel, either
appointed or retained. Trial counsel (prosecuting attorney) is also legally
qualified. The board itself in proper cases can even invoke the death pen-
alty.
The special court-martial does not have a law officer, but the president
of the board, who is not legally qualified, has power to rule on objections.
Counsel for the accused is usually not legally trained though the accused can
retain a civilian attorney at his own expense. This "court" has power to try
any person subject to the Code for any noncapital offense made punishable
by the Code. It cannot adjudge the death penalty, dishonorable discharge,
dismissal, confinement in excess of 6 months, etc.
Summary courts-martial are even more limited since the nonlegal one-
man "judge" represents both the Government and the accused. Some military
personnel such as officers cannot even be tried at a summary court-martial.
Though an accused can retain his own legal counsel, this is infrequently done.
The defendant may refuse a summary court-martial and request trial by
special court-martial. Because of the nonadversary nature of the proceeding
and few safeguards, the court is strictly limited as to the punishment that
can be given. See generally MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES
(1951).
11 10 U.S.C. § 832(b) (1964). No charge is referred to a general court-
martial unless there is a thorough and impartial investigation. This investi-
gation has become known as the article 32 investigation. The investigating
officer is not generally a legal officer but he is usually a major or above. He
cannot have prior knowledge of the case. At the article 32 investigation, the
accused is entitled to counsel and he or his counsel can question witnesses
called by the investigating officer. This procedure is not to be confused with
preliminary police investigation, but is usually conducted after this prelim-
inary evidence has been reviewed and the field of suspects narrowed. See
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNrTED STATES f 34, at 44 (1951).
12 There is no requirement under the Code that the accused be indigent
before counsel will be appointed. See 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1964).
'3 10 U.S.C. § 838(b) (1964).
14 10 U.S.C. § 870(c) (1964).
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Military Appeals had little civilian or military precedent to follow.
Many problems arose that simply could not be answered by reference
to older cases. One of the first problems that was not clearly ans-
wered by the Code was whether right to counsel at the article 32
investigation meant right to legal counsel or merely the right to
"any officer not disqualified by reason of prior participation in the
same case."' 5 The problem was laid to rest in United States v.
Tomaszewski.16 The question raised was exactly in point, i.e. whether
counsel at an article 32 hearing has to be "a lawyer in the pro-
fessional sense.'u 7 Since the pre-trial investigation was required only
for a charge referred to general court-martial, the court concluded
that it was judicial in nature.18 Therefore, legal counsel had to be
provided at this stage as well as at the trial. 9 Often, it would be
useless to require legal counsel at trial, but nonlegal counsel during
the pre-trial investigation. The need for counsel at this stage is
self-evident since the accused has the opportunity to question wit-
nesses, to answer questions, and to set up a defense. The importance
of having qualified counsel during the pre-trial preparation of a case
is vividly illustrated in Powell v. Alabama.2 0 The Supreme Court
there concluded that even the most intelligent layman could not
properly prepare his case. It stated: "He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have
a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him."
21
The next problem that had to be answered was whether pro-
fessional counsel, either retained or appointed, had to be provided
prior to the article 32 investigation. Though the Code did not specif-
ically authorize counsel prior to the investigation, it did not pro-
hibit it. In United States v. Gunnes,22 the accused refused to make
any statements until he could consult with counsel. Though he was
allowed to contact an assistant staff judge advocate, he was told
that military counsel could not be made available at the inter-
rogation stage. The judge advocate did not inform Gunnels that he
could be represented by his own counsel. After the "consultation,"
the accused made an inculpatory statement that was introduced at
his general court-martial. The defense attorney objected to the admis-
sibility of this statement, but the motion was overruled. On review,
the court of military appeals agreed that military counsel need not
be assigned during the investigative stage.23  However, the court
held this did not prevent a person suspected of a crime from con-
sulting with counsel; and if the staff judge advocate or his agent
is consulted, he is obligated to give the accused correct advice.
24
The court emphasized that the position of the staff judge advocate
15 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 6a, at 9 (1951).
16 8 U.S.C.M.A. 266, 24 C.M.R. 76 (1957).
17 Id. at 268, 24 C.M.R. at 78.
18 Id. at 269, 24 C.M.R. at 79.
19 Id.
20 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
21 Id. at 69.
22 8 U.S.C.M.A. 130, 23 C.M.R. 354 (1957).
23 Id. at 134, 23 C.M.R. at 358.
24 Id.
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is not as a partial member of the commander's staff but as "an
impartial adviser to both the Government and the accused.125 Since
the judge advocate misled Gunnels as to the extent of his rights,
the court reversed the conviction. 26 The court then cited In re Gro-
ban27 in support of its view that the accused has the right to have
his own counsel present during the interrogation. That case, accord-
ing to the court in Gunnels, had stood for the proposition that due
process is denied "if a person suspected of a crime is deprived of
the assistance of his own counsel at a 'secret inquisition' by law
enforcement agents.
'28
Gunnels seemed to have answered the question whether re-
tained counsel could be present during interrogation, but this con-
clusion was refuted by the same court in United States v. Melville.
29
It held that Gunnels only decided that a person has the right to
consult counsel.30 However, Melville is clearly a misstatement of the
case. The failure to advise the accused of his right to have retained
counsel present during the interrogation was the reason the advice
was considered inadequate. Chief Judge Quinn had stated for the
majority in Gunnels:
It seems to us to be a relatively simple matter to advise an uninformed
and unknowing accused that, while he has no right to appointed mili-
tary counsel, he does have a right to obtain legal advice and a right
to have his counsel present with him during an interrogation by a
law enforcement agency.3 '
In Melville, counsel of the accused was excluded from the inter-
rogation, and the court refused to decide the issue which was
seemingly answered in Gunnels.32 The court simply concluded that the
accused was not prejudiced by the exclusion of counsel. 33 If the
accused was prejudiced, the decision suggests that the conviction
would have been reversed. It is difficult to see how the denial of
counsel at any stage would not be harmful or prejudicial to the
accused. Once again, the rationale of Tomaszewski is highly con-
vincing in that counsel is needed at every step in the proceeding.
3 4
One author, in analyzing the Melville case, concluded that the court
based its decision on a "volunteered statement not extracted by
interrogation."3 5 This would explain the apparent inconsistency in
Gunnels and Melville, and also the inconsistent statement in the
latter case that: "We do not, however, wish to be understood in
25 Id. (emphasis added).
26 Id.
27 352 U.S. 330 (1957). This case involved investigation of a fire. The
petitioners refused to answer questions without counsel and they were placed
in jail. The Supreme Court held that since it was an administrative hearing,
there was no right or need for counsel. Six of the nine justices were of the
opinion that a person suspected of a crime had the right to his own counsel.
at a secret inquisition. Id. at 337, 352, 353.
28 8 U.S.C.M.A. at 135, 23 C.M.R. at 359 (emphasis added).
29 8 U.S.C.M.A. 597, 25 C.M.R. 101 (1958).
30 Id. at 600, 25 C.M.R. at 104.
31 8 U.S.C.M.A. at 135, 23 C.M.R. at 359 (emphasis added).
32 8 U.S.C.M.A. at 600, 25 C.M.R. at 104.
33 Id.
34 See text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
35 Christensen, Pretrial Right to Counsel, 23 MILITARY L. Rxv. 1, 21 (1964).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 191444
May 1968] MIRANDA AND THE MILITARY
any manner as placing our approval on the practice of excluding the
presence of individually retained counsel from an interrogation prior
to the preferral of charges." 36
In United States v. Cadman37 and United States v. Slamski,3 8
the court continued its apparent regression. In the first case, the
accused was apprehended while attempting to break into the base
exchange. At the air police office, the investigator advised the ac-
cused of his rights under article 31. Cadman expressed his desire
to consult with counsel and the interview was terminated. Though
counsel was never provided, the accused was subjected to further
questioning. On the third encounter with the investigator, the accused
answered incriminating questions that were used at trial. The court
of military appeals concluded that there was no error in the admis-
sion of the statement, accepting the interrogator's explanation that the
expressed desire of Cadman was "a mere preference, not a request
for counsel."39 Judge Ferguson concurred on the basis that the use
of the statements was not prejudicial, but he felt an accused need
not ask for legal counsel "in the terms of technical nicety in order
to be afforded this fundamental right. '40 The decision placed a
further burden on the accused by requiring him to make clear to
the interrogator that he is requesting legal counsel and not merely
showing a desire for counsel.
The accused, in United States v. Slamski, requested a legal
officer.41 Slamski was allowed to see the staff judge advocate who
incorrectly informed him that he could not advise the accused as his
attorney. At this time, the accused did not make any statement.
The next day, Slamski was taken to the staff judge advocate's office,
and upon being confronted with the attorney, he stated, "Sir, I took
$70, but I didn't take all of the money."42  This inculpatory state-
ment was successfully introduced at trial over the objection that the
attorney-client privilege applied. The conviction was not reversed
even though the court of military appeals concluded that the staff
judge advocate had probably misadvised the accused.48  The court
held that Slamski was not harmed by the oversight.44  After all,
he was only convicted. In a vigorous dissent, Judge Ferguson
concluded that Gunnels would require reversal of the conviction
since Slamski was not properly advised.45 He stated: "[W]e are
dealing with an accused's right to consult with an attorney at a time
when he is suspected of a serious criminal offense. This is a basic
constitutional right. [cases cited] ... Its denial violates the re-
quirements of due process. United States v. Gunnels, supra."
46
36 8 U.S.C.M.A. at 600, 25 C.M.R. at 104.
37 10 U.S.C.M.A. 222, 27 C.M.R. 296 (1959).
38 11 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 28 C.AER. 298 (1959).
39 10 U.S.C.M.A. at 223, 27 C.AMR. at 297.
40 Id. at 227, 27 C.M.R. at 301. See United States v. Wheaton, 9 U.S.C.M.A.
257, 26 C.M.R. 37 (1958).
41 I1 U.S.C.M.A. at 74, 28 C.M.R. at 298.
42 Id. at 76, 28 C.M.R. at 300.
43 Id. at 77, 28 C.M.R. at 301.
44 Id. at 78, 28 C.M.R. at 302.
45 Id. at 80, 28 C.M.R. at 304.
46 Id. at 79-80, 28 C.M.R. at 303-04.
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The accused also should have been entitled to rely on the attorney-
client privilege in light of Gunnels. As stated in that case, the staff
judge advocate cannot merely represent the government.47 Before
the judge advocate can properly advise, he must be aware of the
factual situation, and the accused must be given the opportunity to
consult freely with him. If the attorney-client privilege is denied,
this right to consult is merely illusory.
Although Gunnels had made a significant impact on military
law, its importance was diminished by such decisions as Cadman and
Slamski. Further development in the area of right to counsel in the
military had to wait until the United States Supreme Court returned
its decision in Escobedo v. Illinois.
4 s
In Escobedo v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that state-
ments made by the accused during interrogation were improperly
admitted as evidence.49 The conviction was reversed. Justice Gold-
berg, speaking for the majority, adopted the rationale of Powell v.
Alabama in holding that "[t] he 'guiding hand of counsel' was essen-
tial to advise petitioner [Escobedo] of his rights in this delicate
situation."50 The Court, through Justice Goldberg, set out standards
that had to be observed in criminal prosecutions. It stated:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody,
the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been
denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have
not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to re-
main silent, the accused has been denied-"the Assistance of Counsel"
... and that no statement elicited by the police during the interro-
gation may be used against him at a criminal trial.51
The first important question that confronted the courts applying
the Escobedo rule was what factors were to be used to determine
when the investigation began to "focus" on the accused.52 Even the
later Miranda decision has not completely answered this question
though new terminology has replaced the word "focus."53 The second
question was whether it was necessary for the accused to request
counsel before the Escobedo standards had to be applied. Courts soon
recognized that this fundamental right should not depend on whether
the accused realized that he could request counsel. 54 After all, the
necessity for such standards is based on the premise that the layman
is not experienced in law, and is incapable of properly asserting
his legal rights.55
47 8 U.S.C.M.A. at 134, 23 C.I.R. at 358.
48 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
49 Id. at 492.
50 Id. at 486.
51 Id. at 490-91 (emphasis added).
52 See Van Pelt, The Meaning and Scope of Escobedo v. Illinois, 38 F.R.D.
441 (1966); People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361,
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965).
53 In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that a warning is required if the
accused is subjected to "custodial interrogation." 384 U.S. at 444.
54 See People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361,
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965).
55 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
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In light of United States v. Clay,5 6 the Escobedo decision
seemed binding on the court of military appeals. In the Clay case, the
court indicated that it would give the same legal effect to "rights
granted by Congress to military personnel as do civilian courts to
those granted to civilians by the Constitution or by other federal
statutes. '57 Since right to counsel had been granted to military
personnel by Congress, the legal effect of Escobedo should have been
applied by the military court.
The policy advocated in Clay was not followed, however, for the
court of military appeals declared its independence of the Supreme
Court in United States v. Wimberley.58 The court virtually refused
to follow the determination of the Supreme Court as to what right
to counsel means. Chief Judge Quinn, speaking for a unanimous
court, stated the court had not been persuaded by Escobedo or coun-
sel's argument "that the right to counsel must be extended to include
the investigative processes."59  The court expressed its belief that
other methods could effectively protect the accused and "give maxi-
mum effect to the Constitutional right to the assistance of counsel."60
Wimberley, of course, can be distinguished from Escobedo since the
accused had not requested counsel. Even if an attorney had been
requested, his exclusion from the interrogation would not have
brought reversal. The accused's only right, according to the reason-
ing of the court, was the right to consult with his requested coun-
sel.1 The confusion of the court continued until the Supreme Court
decided Miranda v. Arizona.
62
Miranda and Tempia
In Miranda v. Arizona, the petitioner did not request counsel
during interrogation.6 3 Two hours after the questioning began, he
made a written confession.64 The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction holding: "[I]t is clear that Miranda was not in any way
apprised of his right to consult with an attorney and to have one
present during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be com-
pelled to incriminate himself effectively protected in any manner." 65
It also reaffirmed Escobedo indicating that the decision in that case
did not depend upon the mere fact that Escobedo had requested
counsel.66 Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the majority, set out
the standards that must be observed by society in the prosecution of
crime.67 He stated:
56 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951). See Quinn, The United States
Court of Military Appeals and Military Due Process, 35 St. John's L. Rev. 225
(1961).
57 1 U.S.C.M.A. at 77, 1 C.M.R. at 77.
58 16 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 36 C.M.R. 159 (1966).
59 Id. at 10, 36 C.M.R. at 166.
60 Id.
01 Id.
62 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 492.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 442.
67 Id. at 444-45.
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As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully
effective means are devised .. the following measures are required.
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner
and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an at-
torney before speaking there can be no questioning.68
Unless the Government can show to the court that it has used these
"procedural safeguards," it cannot use any statement "stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant."'6 9 The burden is not on the
accused, but on the Government to affirmatively show that the
standards have been met.70 The Court in Miranda did allow other
effective safeguards to be used as long as they fully protect the
accused, but this would place an even greater burden on the prose-
cutor to prove that his nonadjudicated procedure complied with the
requirements set out by the Supreme Court.7 1
The Court created a new test to apply in determining when these
safeguards would be required. In Escobedo, the warning was not
necessary until the investigation had "focused" on the accused.
72
Miranda requires a warning if the accused is subjected to "custodial
interrogation. ' 73  The Court defined "custodial interrogation" as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. '74 Subsequent cases have shown that
the Miranda test has not eliminated the difficulties apparent in the
Escobedo test.75 Courts still have difficulty in determining whether
the accused in each case was significantly deprived of his freedom
of action.7 6 But the test has made it apparent that counsel must
be provided at the earliest possible moment.
The principles and problems raised by Miranda apparently
applied only to civilian courts, but on April 25, 1967, the Wimberley
decision was overruled by the United States Court of Military
Appeals.77 In a two-to-one decision, the court, in United States v.
Tempia, held that the principles of Miranda apply to the military.78
Tempia had been taken into custody for questioning and advised
of his rights under article 31. In addition, he was advised he could
consult counsel and upon his request for counsel the interview was
terminated. After the second encounter with the investigating offi-
cer, the accused met with the staff judge advocate. Though the
68 Id.
69 Id. at 444.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 378 U.S. at 490.
73 384 U.S. at 444.
74 Id.
75 See, e.g., People v. Allen, 50 Misc. 2d 897, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct.
1966). See generally, Graham, What is "Custodial Interrogation?": California's
Anticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 59 (1966).
76 People v. Allen, 50 Misc. 2d 897, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
77 United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
78 Id. at 640, 37 C.M.R. at 260.
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judge advocate advised Tempia as an "impartial arbiter," he stated
that he could neither accept the accused as a client nor appoint
counsel until charges were preferred.7 9 In a third encounter with
an agent of the Office of Special Investigation, the accused confessed
because counsel "didn't do me no good."8 0 The accused was con-
victed of taking indecedent liberties with females. The warning
was held insufficient under the standards set out by the Miranda
decision and the court of military appeals reversed the conviction.81
The first argument against applying the Miranda doctrine to the
military was made in an amicus curiae brief by the Judge Advocate
General of the Navy. He argued that military law was not affected
by the constitutional limitations applicable to civilian law.8 2 Judge
Ferguson, speaking for the majority in Tempia, quickly discarded
this argument stating: "The time is long since past ... when this
Court will lend an attentive ear to the argument that members of
the armed services are, by reason of their status, ipso facto, deprived
of all protections of the Bill of Rights. '8 3 United States v. Jacoby84
was cited for the same proposition that servicemen are entitled to
protections established by the Bill of Rights, "except those which are
expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable."8 5 The court
79 Id. at 632, 37 C.M.R. at 252.
so Id.
81 Id. at 640, 37 C.M.R. at 260.
82 Id. at 633, 37 C.M.R. at 252. The argument made by the Judge Ad-
vocate General of the Navy received some support recently in Comment,
United States v. Tempia: The Questionable Application of Miranda to the Mili-
tary, 13 VILL. L. REv. 170 (1967). The author suggested that because of the
dichotomy between the military and civilian legal systems, the Constitutional
safeguards guaranteed to civilians cannot be given to military defendants. To
support this proposition, the author cited Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
In Reid, the wife of a member of the armed services was convicted by a
court-martial of a capital crime. The Supreme Court concluded that since
there was no trial by jury and few Bill of Rights' protections afforded civil-
ians by the Constitution in a court-martial, it did not have jurisdiction. Id.
at 16. In Black's discussion, though dictum, he did use loose language ex-
plaining that the fifth and sixth amendment safeguards "cannot be given in
a military trial." Id. at 22. This, Black stated, is because, "In the military,
by necessity, emphasis must be placed on the security and order of the group
rather than on the value and integrity of the individual." Id. at 39. It is
difficult to understand how right to counsel will defeat this security. But
Black also carefully noted: "As yet it has not been clearly settled to what
extent the Bill of Rights and other protective parts of the Constitution apply
to Military trials." Id. at 37.
Black did not wish to prevent the amelioration of the military legal sys-
tem, but he simply recognized the embryonic nature of military law. He was
more concerned with reversing the conviction of the petitioner than under-
taking the job of revising military justice, a job which he was unauthorized
to undertake. In support of his conclusion, Black merely attempted to show
the defects in the system. He did recognize that vast improvements had been
made in the field of military law emphasizing that these changes were due to
the courts-martial incorporating "more and more" civilian court methods.
Id. at 37. The Supreme Court did not and could not prohibit the results
reached in Tempia.
83 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 633, 37 C.M.R. at 253.
84 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
s Id. at 430-31, 29 C.M.R. at 246-47.
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further supported in a 1953 Supreme Court decision, Burns v. Wil-
son.8 Judge Ferguson stated: "The impact of Burns v. Wilson, ....
then, is of an unequivocal holding by the Supreme Court that the
protections of the Constitution are available to servicemen in military
trials."sr The holding in Burns was not unequivocal; nevertheless, the
Supreme Court did hold that the civilian courts must determine if the
military had given fair consideration to any claim by an accused
that his constitutional rights had been violated.8 8 The court of
military appeals then held that since the Supreme Court determines
the extent of these Constitutional rights, its views on these issues
are binding on the military.89 Therefore, since the Miranda decision
was based on protections of the Constitution, its principles are appli-
cable to the military.
Judge Ferguson then quoted the Miranda standards holding that
these must be observed in a military proceeding.9 0 He held that the
advice as to counsel did not meet the procedural safeguards required
by Miranda since the accused was not informed that counsel would
be appointed. 91 Tempia was merely advised that counsel could be
retained. The Government argued that even if the standards applied,
the accused was not significantly deprived of his freedom since he was
already under the control of the military. The court disregarded
this argument stating: "It ignores the realities of that situation to
say that one ordered to appear for interrogation has not been sig-
nificantly deprived of his freedom of action."92  Though military
personnel are under the control of their commanding officer, they
are not subject to indiscriminate interrogation or arrest, and to order
one to appear for interrogation is certainly a deprivation of his free-
dom of movement.
The Government also argued that counsel could not be provided
at government expense since it would be contrary to the intent of
Congress.9 3 This also was rejected by the court:
Undoubtedly, Congress provides funds for the payment of defense
counsel, but we know of no prohibition ... against such being made
available to the accused when he is initially interrogated . . . by
police officers. Indeed, the impact of Miranda upon the administra-
tion of military justice should be far less than that in comparable
civilian jurisdictions.
94
The court of military appeals indicated that even if Congress did
not intend to provide funds for this purpose, the Government would
have to use the alternate procedure, i.e. disregard any evidence gath-
ered during the pre-trial interrogation.98
86 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
87 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 634, 37 C.M.R. at 254.
88 346 U.S. at 144. See generally Gallagher v. Quinn, 363 F.2d 301 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
89 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 640, 37 C.M.R. at 260.
90 Id. at 636, 37 C.M.R. at 256.
91 Id. at 637, 37 C.M.R. at 257.
92 Id. at 636, 37 C.M.R. at 256. See 31 U.S.C. § 628 (1964).
93 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 638, 37 C.M.R. at 258.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 639, 37 C.M.R. at 259. Tempia, according to one writer, will
require a lawyer on every ship. Comment, United States v. Tempia: The
Questionable Application of Miranda to the Military, 13 VmL. L. REv. 170, 184
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In conclusion, the court reiterated the effect of its decision:
Now, the accused must have a lawyer; before, he need not have been
given one; now, he must be warned of his right to counsel; before, he
need not be so warned; and, now, finally, he will receive effective
legal advice not only as to what he can do, but also what he should
do.96
With the Tempia decision, military law was finally in line with
civilian law in the area of right to counsel.
The Aftermath
Followng Tempia, the court of military appeals was faced with
the problem of applying the Miranda-Tempia standards to actual
factual situations. In United States v. Burns,97 the court reversed
the conviction on the ground that the defendant was told only that
he was entitled to "consult with legal counsel" if he so desired.
Since the facts in Burns were similar to those in Tempia, the
case needs little discussion.
An interesting factual situation was present in United States v.
McCauley.98 The defendant had failed to report to Quantico, Virginia
and remained in San Diego until he was picked up by civilian police
on an unrelated charge. An FBI agent, suspecting the accused of
desertion, interrogated McCauley in the San Diego jail. The agent
warned him that he had the right to talk to a lawyer of his choice
or anyone else. The accused was not told that he had the right to
a retained or appointed lawyer present at the interrogation. As a
result of this interview, inculpatory statements were obtained and
successfully introduced at McCauley's trial.
Clearly, the warning in McCauley was improper in light of the
Miranda-Tempia standards. However, the Government argued that
since the accused had not been taken into custody by the FBI agent
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of movement in any significant
manner, the warning was not necessary. Chief Judge Quinn agreed
with this contention, stating that the jail was the sentenced prisoner's
"place of abode." 99 The Chief Judge stated that there was no more
restraint or psychological pressure in jail than in one's own home. 0 0
The majority of the court disagreed with Chief Judge Quinn and
reversed the conviction. 0 1 In a well supported decision, Judge Kilday
concluded that the Miranda-Tempia test is compulsion, not coercion.'
0 2
(1967). As stated in Tempia, the cost of added counsel is not a valid argu-
ment for denying procedural safeguards. 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 638, 37 C.M.R. at
258, But ships generally travel in a fleet and legal counsel can be easily
obtained. Even if counsel could not be provided, the investigators would
simply have to disregard any statement by the accused unless waiver could
be shown. This would not prevent investigation of.the offense. Id. at 639,
37 C.M.R. at 259.
90 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 640, 37 C.M.R. at 260.
97 17 U.S.C.M.A. 39, 40, 37 C.M.R. 303, 304 (1967). See, e.g., United States
v. Roan, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 163, 37 C.M.R. 427 (1967).
98 17 U.S.C.M.A. 81, 37 C.M.R. 345 (1967).
99 Id. at 86, 37 C.M.R. at 350 (dissent).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 85, 37 C.M.R. at 349.
102 Id. at 84, 37 C.M.R. at 349. Judge Kilday cited People v. Allen, 50
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He held for the majority that "compulsion is inherent in custodial
surroundings" and therefore the Miranda-Tempia warning was neces-
sary. 03 Though the court's reasoning is excellent, its result could
have been reached merely by reference to the Miranda decision. The
Miranda definition of "custodial interrogation" encompasses the in-
stant case since McCauley was subject to "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers" after he had "been taken into custody."
0 4
Chief Justice Warren had stated in Miranda that in each of the cases
being considered "the defendant was questioned . . . in a room in
which he was cut off from the outside world."'010 Certainly, McCauley
was "cut off" and he shared other salient features evident in Miranda,
i.e. "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full
warnings of constitutional rights."'106 The danger of private interro-
gation that Miranda sought to eliminate was present in McCauley
making it necessary to reverse the conviction.
In United States v. Ballard,107 an Air Force policeman was en-
gaged in routine patrol. One of the areas of his patrol was the
base equipment manufacturing office. He noticed a private vehicle
parked behind the building and saw someone receive a box from
another in the building. The box was placed in the private auto-
mobile. The policeman asked the occupant of the vehicle whether
or not he worked in the building, and the latter responded, "Give me
a break."'08 The policeman then requested his identification and
the occupant answered, "How much is it worth to you? Fifty dollars
if you let me go."' 0 9 At this point, the accused was advised of his
rights but his prior statements were successfully introduced at trial
over defense counsel's objection. It was shown at trial that author-
ized persons could remove tools from the building and therefore the
questioning was mere routine and not an interrogation. This view
Misc. 2d 897, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1966), in support of his conclusion
that the Miranda-Tempia test is compulsion, not coercion. In Allen, the de-
fendant had been questioned in his home by a policeman. Though there was
no formal arrest, the policeman testified that he would not have allowed Al-
len to leave the room. No coercive pressure was evident. The judge still
held that since no warning had been given, the inculpatory statements were
inadmissible as evidence. He based his decision on the fact that the new
standard under Miranda is compulsion, not coercion. Id. at 903, 272 N.Y.S.2d
at 255. In his analysis of Miranda, he emphasized that there was no proof of
coercion. The mere fact that Miranda was in custody and deprived of his
freedom of action was considered decisive. Though the judge in Allen could
not point to a "precise dictionary meaning" of the word compulsion, he stated:
"'Compulsion' under the Fifth Amendment and its State counterpart does
not have its precise dictionary meaning. It has no relationship to 'coercion'
and is applicable in many settings not related to any 'critical stage.' Com-
pulsion is simply questioning in any setting . .. where a criminal fact may
be elicited." Id. (footnotes omitted). Certainly McCauley was subjected to
questioning in the hope of eliciting a criminal fact.
103 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 85-86, 37 C.M.R. at 349-50.
104 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
105 Id. at 445.
106 Id.
107 17 U.S.C.M.A. 96, 37 C.M.R. 360 (1967).
108 Id. at 97, 37 C.M.R. at 361.
109 Id.
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was adopted by the court of military appeals.110 The court upheld
the conviction stating: "Not every routine or administrative check
by a policeman of a serviceman's identification must be preceded by
Article 31 warning.... [T]his was not an interrogation within the
contemplation of United States v. Tempia . . . .""I The rationale
of the holding was that the questioning "was not designed, nor geared,
to elicit a statement of incrimination.""1
2
It is true that the danger in Miranda and Tempia was not apparent
in Ballard since there was no secret interrogation "in a police-domi-
nated atmosphere."" 83 But as soon as the defendant stated, "Give me
a break," the routine nature of the questioning had changed. At
this time, the policeman must have been aware that the accused was
attempting to conceal some illegal act. The policeman should
then have warned the accused of his rights. But this places an
unreasonable burden on the individual policeman to know in every
situation at what precise point the warning must be given. Since
there was no psychological pressure or the same degree of compulsion
as in previously discussed cases, the result seems to be proper.
In another interesting case, United States v. Hinkson,"4 an in-
former had procured incriminating evidence from the accused while
the latter was waiting to be interrogated. Relying on Massiah v.
United States,"5 Hinkson's counsel contended that since the informer
was a "de facto agent" of the police, he had to warn the accused
of his rights." 6 Since no warning was given, the defense counsel
concluded that the inculpatory statements should be inadmissible as
evidence. Massiah had held only that after indictment a defendant
cannot be subjected to secret interrogation either by police or by an
agent cooperating with them."7  Hinkson had not even been ques-
tioned. But since the inculpatory statements had been procured by
an agent of the police at the police station, there was some basis
under Tempia for the defense counsel's objection to their admissi-
bility. The majority of the court of military appeals did not accept
this argument. Chief Judge Quinn, speaking for the court, held:
"The fact that the conversation took place in the waiting room of a
police station does not cloak it with a constitutional immunity greater
than that present in other public places."" 8 The basis of the court's
holding was that there was no element of custodial coercion." 9 The
Chief Judge had eliminated the McCauley test of whether there was
compulsion present.
In a dissenting opinion in Hinkson, Judge Ferguson recognized
the importance of the informer in solving crimes, but reasonably
concluded that the "mask of the informer ... must be laid aside at
110 Id. at 98, 37 C.M.R. at 362.
ill Id.
112 Id. at 99, 37 C.M.R. at 363.
I's Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
"4 17 U.S.C.M.A. 126, 37 C.M.R. 390 (1967).
"5 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
116 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 127, 37 C.MR. at 391; accord, Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964).
"7 377 U.S. at 207.
118 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 128, 37 C.M.R. at 392.
"19 Id.
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the door of the police station."' 20 He further stated that:
The substance of [Chief Judge Quinn's] position seems to be that if a
military policeman openly announces himself as such, after the sus-
pect's arrest, he must advise the accused of his rights and see that
they are protected. But, if he pins his badge to his underwear, care-
fully conceals his identity as a cop, and approaches the accused on an
histrionic basis, he is, by reason of his acting ability excused from
complying with the mandate of Congress.
12 1
Though Judge Ferguson overstated his position, his point is well
taken, especially in light of the unusual facts in the instant case. The
line must be drawn at some point, and that line has been drawn
by the Miranda-Tempia decisions. Using the Miranda standards,
Tempia held that military personnel ordered to report for interro-
gation are significantly deprived of freedom of movement. 122 There-
fore, the warning was required and the testimony extracted by the
agent of the police should have been excluded.
Waiver and Retroactivify of Tempia
After Tempia, the court of military appeals also had to consider
both the question of retroactivity of the decision and waiver of one's
rights. United States v. Swift 23 reiterated the holding in Tempia
that its doctrine is retroactive only to the date of the Miranda de-
cision. The defendant Swift had been convicted of murder in a trial
occurring prior to the Miranda decision. The warning was not in
accordance with the Miranda-Tempia standards, but was in accordance
with the Wimberley standards.124 The court upheld the conviction. 2 5
As to the waiver of the constitutional safeguards, the guidelines
seemed to be clearly set out in Tempia and Miranda. Both cases
held that the defendant may waive his rights if "the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."'126 The two cases placed a
heavy burden on the Government to show that the defendant was
warned of his right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination
if the accused confessed without an attorney.127  However, in
United States v. Hardy,128 the Government attempted to argue that
the actual burden of proving that a statement was made in a Miranda-
Tempia situation was upon the defendant. The court of military
appeals correctly rejected this contention stating:
What is involved here is not judicial supervision of rules of evi-
dence, but constitutional rights of an accused.... [Tlhe Govern-
ment has the burden of proving that an accused or suspect was not
deprived of, or denied, the right of counsel when asked to make a
statement.129
This is the only plausible conclusion since the Government is in
120 Id. at 129, 37 C.M.R. at 393.
121 Id. at 131, 37 C.M.R. at 395.
122 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 636, 37 C.M.R. at 256.
123 17 U.S.C.M.A. 227, 38 C.MLR. 25 (1967).
124 Id. at 231, 38 C.M.R. at 29.
125 Id. at 235, 38 C.M.R. at 33.
126 384 U.S. at 444; 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 638, 37 C.M.R. at 258.
127 384 U.S. at 475; 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 638, 37 C.MI.R. at 258.
128 17 U.S.C.M.A. 100, 37 C.M.R. 364 (1967).
129 Id. at 102, 37 C.M.R. at 366.
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control of the facts and circumstances of the arrest and questioning
of the accused. The burden could seldom be met by the accused
since witnesses friendly to him are usually not present during the
interrogation.
Special and Summary Courts-Martial
One of the most important questions that remains is whether a
defendant involved in a special or summary court-martial should be
represented by counsel. The Tempia decision created an anomaly in
the military judicial system. As stated earlier, it requires that an
accused be provided with counsel as soon as he is deprived of "his
freedom of action in any significant way."'130 Hence, under this
doctrine, the accused must be given this right to counsel during
"custodial interrogation" even if he is later tried at a special or
summary court-martial. But unless he is tried in a general court-
martial, he is not entitled at trial to legally qualified counsel.
Therefore, he is given the right to professional counsel before trial
but not at trial. This procedure is untenable in light of both Tempia
and Miranda.
Prior to United States v. Tempia, three federal district courts had
considered whether the sixth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution requires the appointment of legal counsel to represent mili-
tary personnel before special courts-martial. In In re Stapley,'
31
the accused was charged with a serious crime, but was represented
at a special court-martial by nonlegal counsel. He was convicted
and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court
granted the writ stating as a conclusion of law that:
[Tihe Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
applies to proceedings before special courts-martial in the military
service, as far as concerns the right to the assistance of counsel on
the part of the accused, particularly where the charges are substan-
tial or involve moral turpitude or may result in a substantial depriva-
tion of liberty. 32
The judge refused to decide if legal counsel need be provided in
every special court-martial, but he emphasized that though the
military exigency may limit the right to counsel, "such exigency often
renders constitutional protection all the more indispensable."'
' 3 3
In Le Ballister v. Warden,3 4 the petitioner had been previously
convicted in a special court-martial for absence without leave. The
court considered the fact that the petitioner was well educated and
had not requested civilian counsel as significant in its determination.
The writ was denied on the basis that the accused was not entitled
as a matter of right under the sixth amendment to representation
by legal counsel. 3 5 The judge distinguished In re Stapley since
Stapley was charged with a more serious crime.136 But an AWOL
130 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 636, 37 C.iMLR. at 256, citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. at 444 (1966).
131 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
132 Id. at 320.
133 Id.
134 247 F. Supp. 349 (D. Kan. 1965).
135 Id. at 352.
136 Id.
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conviction can result in "a substantial deprivation of liberty.'
37
The court concluded that the accused's right to be represented"springs" from the action of Congress, not the sixth amendment. 13
Congress, however, cannot act contrary to the constitutional amend-
ments even though it has authority under article 1 of the Constitution
"To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces."
The same result as in Le Ballister was reached in Kennedy v.
Commandant.139 The court concluded that Congress has "an overrid-
ing power" in the area of military justice. 40 It suggested that the
only way military personnel could be granted right to counsel at
special courts-martial would be by an act of Congress.
The conclusion in Stapley is the only possible result even though
the two later cases refused to follow the decision. The Tempia
doctrine disallows any other interpretation as to whether the sixth
amendment applies to the military. The Stapley conclusion must be
reached even if the crime is not serious if the accused is to have
"effective legal advice" as advocated in Tempia.141  It is difficult
to consider any crime minor if the accused is subject to incarceration,
and attending consequences in his future life.
The argument that the cost and number of additional judge advo-
cates would be exorbitant as brought out in Tempia should not
prevent the protection of the accused's rights. But this problem may
be alleviated to a large degree. One solution to this problem is to
certify attorneys not members of the Judge Advocate General's
Corps for special court-martial duty. Many civilian lawyers fulfill
their military obligation by serving in other branches. This is
due both to the shorter period of time required in other branches
and the limited number of openings in the Judge Advocate General's
Corps. The attorney could be given a short period of training in
military justice at his basic branch school, and still fulfill his regular
duties once he is assigned. The number of special courts-martial is
relatively small as illustrated in a recent survey.142 The average
137 In re Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316, 320 (D. Utah 1965).
138 247 F. Supp. at 352.
139 258 F. Supp. 967 (D. Kan. 1966).
140 Id. at 969.
141 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 640, 37 C.M.R. at 260. It has been argued that since
courts-martial are not truly adversary proceedings, the Miranda-Tempia doc-
trine is not necessary. Comment, United States v. Tempia: The Questionable
Application of Miranda to the Military, 13 VILL. L. REV. 170, 179 (1967). This
argument can be made at the summary court-martial level and in a sense at
the special court-martial level since counsel is not generally legally-trained
counsel. But this is not a reason for denying procedural safeguards. If any-
thing, more safeguards are required in such a proceeding since an accused
is generally not capable of defending himself. Counsel is certainly needed
at every step of the proceeding. It cannot be successfully argued that the
defendant will not be prejudiced without counsel. At the general court-
martial level, the adversary nature of the proceeding cannot be doubted. Both
trial counsel and defense counsel are legally qualified. A law officer, sitting
as judge, rules on points of law and instructs the members of the court.
142 Miscellaneous Military Justice, 67 JUDGE ADVOcATE LEGAL SERv., May
25, 1967, at 18 (Dep't of Army, Pamph. No. 27-67-11).
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special court-martial rate according to the survey was 2.04 per 1,000
military personnel during the first quarter of 1967.143 The largest
number of trials were held within the continental United States
144
which would allow the greatest number of non-judge advocate attor-
neys to remain within the United States. This practice would not
only eliminate vast expense to the Government, but it would enable
the accused to be given the necessary procedural safeguards.
Summary courts-martial should be eliminated from the military
judicial system. The one-man court does not provide necessary pro-
cedural safeguards since the "judge" is not trained in military law.
145
Counsel is also not provided which is contrary to the dictates of
Tempia. This, of course, would mean more pressure on the non-
judge advocate attorneys if the practice outlined above were adopted,
but heavier allowance could be placed upon nonjudicial punishment
under article 15 of the Code. 46 The accused can refuse such punish-
ment and request a court-martial if he so desires. He can also
consult with counsel before he makes his choice. If he accepts the
nonjudicial punishment, he is only subjected to a small fine or
limited restriction. The accused is not subjected to the stigma of
having a court-martial conviction since the article 15 punishment is
not usually made a permanent part of the accused's records. It is
of importance to the military not only in retaining discipline, but
also in preventing incarceration of important military personnel for
minor infringements of regulations. Of course, nonjudicial punish-
ment is not offered to those suspected of serious crime.
Conclusion
United States v. Tempia makes applicable the fifth and' sixth
amendments of the United States Constitution to the military by
incorporating the principles of Miranda. But the reasoning of the
court of military appeals makes it clear that all constitutional rights
granted to civilians as interpreted by the Supreme Court will be
granted to military personnel unless the exigencies of the situation
prevent such application. Even in the latter case, it seems the
court will place a heavy burden on the Government to show that
under the circumstances the rights must be denied. The Tempia
decision has almost eliminated the gap between military and civilian
law, and future cases should eliminate the gap completely.
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